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PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS
To the best of defendants' knowledge, there are no prior or
related judicial appeals in this case.
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Case No. 20010097-SC
Priority No. 15
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
MICHAEL KOURIS, individually, and for the
ESTATE OF MICHAEL KOURIS, a deceased minor; and
PAM KOURIS, individually,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL, STATE OF UTAH and
CORTLAND CHILDS,
Defendants and Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action in December,
1998 (R. 1-5), alleging that defendants had wrongfully caused the
death of their son in a collision between his bicycle and
defendant state trooper Childs1 patrol vehicle.

Subsequent to

defendants' answer (R. 15-21), plaintiffs added claims for
negligent supervision and civil rights violations (amended
complaint, R. 62-69) . On August 7, 2000, defendants moved the
court separately to dismiss the civil rights claims (R. 115-37),
to dismiss the claims against defendant Childs (R. 138-55), and
to grant summary judgment on all claims (R. 156-214) .

They

further moved on September 18, 2000, to strike the affidavit of
plaintiffs1 sole designated expert witness filed in response to
these motions (R. 289-355).

After an exchange of memoranda and

hearings on three dates--during one of which plaintiffs
stipulated to dismiss their civil rights claims and the

individual claims against Trooper Childs (R. 651 at 9)--the
district court granted summary judgment for defendants on January
3, 2001, and also declined plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 56(f) (R. 605-14).

On

January 29, 2001, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal
(R. 645-46) .

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 2001) as a case
not within the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Court
of Appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court correctly find that there were no

genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment for
defendants?
Plaintiffs cite to R. 360 and 363 as the portions of the
record preserving their claim that the trial court erroneously
made findings of material fact (see Aplt. Brief at 1 ) . However,
these record citations do not identify any material facts found
by the court that are subject to dispute.

The court ruled in

defendants' favor on the undisputed facts (see R. 611-12).
Standard of Review:

"On appeal from a summary judgment,

this Court resolves only legal issues, and we do not, therefore,
defer to the trial court's rulings.

We determine only whether

the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether
the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues

2

of material fact."

Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah

1989); see also Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, 1|l2, 28 P.3d 1271.
2.

Did the district court correctly hold that Trooper

Childs1 actions were immunized from liability under the exception
to waiver of immunity for the operation of an emergency vehicle
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10(15) (Supp. 2001) and
41-6-14 (1998) ?
Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their memorandum opposing
summary judgment (see R. 364-68).

The court ruled in defendants1

favor on the issue (see R. 612).
Standard of Review:
correctness.
3.

the Court reviews questions of law for

See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151; Hill, 2001 UT 16, 1l2.

Did the district court err in striking the affidavit of

plaintiffs1 sole designated expert witness as irrelevant to the
issues for decision and because he was unqualified to opine on
Trooper Childs1 alleged impairment by prescription medications?
Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their memorandum opposing
defendants1 motion to strike the expert's affidavit (see
R. 502-513).

The court ruled for defendants on this issue (see

R. 612).
Standard of Review:

"[Q]uestions regarding the relevance of

evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion."
Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, 1l9, 979 P.2d 317.

Slisze v.
Moreover,

" [t]he determination of whether a witness is qualified as an
expert is within the trial court's discretion."

3

Vitale v.

Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 361 (Utah App. 1996); see also
Patev v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, 1|l5, 977 P.2d 1193.
4.

Did the court abuse its discretion in denying

plaintiffs1 motion to reconsider, under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and
56(f), its grant of summary judgment for defendants to allow
evidence from a former treating physician whose identity
defendants had previously disclosed to them but whom plaintiffs
did not name as a witness?
Plaintiffs raised the issue of submitting this additional
evidence by motion and memorandum to the court (R. 539-78).

The

court ruled for defendants on this issue (see R. 607).
Standard of Review:

"We review the trial court's denial of

a motion to reconsider summary judgment under rule 60(b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion."
Hall. 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997).

of the
Lund v.

Likewise, this Court "will

review a trial court's grant or denial of a rule 56(f) motion
under an abuse of discretion standard."

Price Dev. Co. v. Orem

City, 2000 UT 26, ^30, 995 P.2d 1237.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained
in the body of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Plaintiffs filed their complaint and jury demand on December

21, 1998 (R. 1-5). The complaint asserted that Trooper Childs'
negligent operation of a patrol vehicle caused it to collide with
the bicycle on which plaintiffs' 11-year-old son, Michael, was
riding, injuring the boy and ultimately causing his death (R. 2 ) .
It further alleged that at all relevant times, Trooper Childs was
acting within the course and scope of his employment and that
defendants Utah Highway Patrol and the State of Utah are
therefore vicariously liable (R. 2 ) . Plaintiffs sought special
and general damages for Michael's medical expenses, suffering,
funeral expenses, and wrongful death (R. 5) . Defendants answered
(R. 15-21), denying liability and raising a number of defenses,
including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and protection from liability under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint (R. 62-69)
to add claims of negligent supervision, based on Trooper Child's
alleged prescription drug dependencies, and violations of their
civil rights.

On August 7, 2000, defendants filed three motions:

one seeking dismissal of the civil rights claims (R. 115-37);
another seeking dismissal of the claims against Trooper Childs
(R. 138-55); and a third seeking summary judgment on all claims
based on governmental immunity (R. 156-214).

At a hearing on

September 18, 2000, plaintiffs agreed not to contest the first
5

two motions, withdrawing their civil rights claims and all
individual claims against Trooper Childs (R. 651 at 9-10).
Also on September 18, 2000, defendants moved to strike the
affidavit of plaintiffs' sole designated expert witness, Richard
Streumpler (R. 289-355), which was attached as an exhibit to
plaintiffs' oppositional memoranda, and to exclude'him from
testifying at trial.

The basis for the motion was that, as a

clinical chemist with no medical training, he is incompetent to
opine as to Trooper Childs1 alleged impairment by prescribed
medications at the time of the accident.

At plaintiffs1 request,

the summary judgment hearing was continued to October 2, 2000
(R. 652) to address the motion to strike following an exchange of
memoranda, and the district court judge granted both motions from
the bench on that date (R. 652 at 16 and 52).
On October 17, 2000, plaintiffs moved the court to
reconsider its summary judgment ruling pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b) and 56(f) (R. 539-78), arguing that another witness,
from among plaintiffs' generically designated "medical providers
who have treated defendant Cortland Childs in the past" (R. 108),
could render an expert opinion as to Trooper Childs' alleged
impairment.

Defendants opposed this asserted "new evidence,"

arguing, inter alia, that the witness in question had been
disclosed to plaintiffs well in advance of argument on the
summary judgment motion but plaintiffs had never designated him
by name as a witness or for purposes other than to authenticate
medical records and reports (R. 579-88) . After a third hearing
6

date on November 27, 2000 (R. 653), the court agreed with
defendants that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 56(f) and denied the motion to reconsider in
a memorandum decision filed January 3, 2001 (R. 605-14).
Plaintiffs1 notice of appeal followed on January 29, 2001
(R. 645-46).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
On July 19, 1998, a collision occurred in Price, Utah,

between a Utah Highway Patrol vehicle driven by Trooper Childs
and a bicycle operated by Michael Kouris, the eleven-year-old son
of plaintiffs, which resulted in Michael's death (R. 2 ) .
Plaintiffs acknowledge that at the time of the accident, Trooper
Childs was acting within the course and scope of his employment
with the Utah Highway Patrol (R. 2) .
Just before the accident occurred, Trooper Childs received a
radio transmission describing a child riding in the trunk of an
automobile and holding down the trunk lid (R. 161 and 187). When
he realized that he was the closest officer to the reported
vehicle, Trooper Childs responded by increasing his speed in an
attempt to catch up to the reported vehicle (R. 162 and 188). At
that time, a red car was in front of him, northbound on Carbon
Avenue, a two-way street with one lane of traffic in either
direction and a center turning lane (R. 162 and 190). As the red
car approached the intersection of Carbon Avenue and 500 South,
it slowed to accommodate a decreased speed limit (R. 162-63 and
3 93).

At the same time, Trooper Childs began to pull into the
7

center lane to pass the red car and activated his emergency
lights (R. 163 and 190)--just as Michael Kouris steered his
bicycle onto the roadway from the east shoulder where he had been
riding (R. 163 and 403), more than 36 feet short of the crosswalk
(R. 195). Although Trooper Childs swerved in an attempt to avert
a collision (R. 190), he was unable to avoid the impact which
resulted in Michael 1 s injuries.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for the
negligent acts of its employees, with certain exceptions.

One of

those exceptions is for injury that "arises out of, in connection
with, or results from . . . (15) the operation of an emergency
vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements
of Section 41-6-14."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001).

The undisputed facts show that Trooper Childs was in compliance
with the statute at the time of the accident.

Consequently, the

district court correctly applied the law and determined that
defendants bore no liability for the actions that resulted in
Michael's unfortunate death.

To the extent that plaintiffs

contend there are genuine factual disputes, they have either
neglected to raise the issues in the district court, thereby
waiving them for purposes of appeal, or failed to demonstrate
that the facts they now contest are material to this Court's
decision.

8

Plaintiffs attempt to escape summary judgment by claiming
that Trooper Childs was impaired at the time of the accident by
the use of prescription medications.

However, the sole evidence

presented in the district court to support this theory was the
affidavit of a clinical chemist with no medical training.

As the

court correctly ruled, any nexus between Trooper Childs1
prescription medications and his alleged impairment was beyond
the competence of this witness.

Excluding his affidavit from

consideration was therefore within the court's discretion.
Finally, plaintiffs claim that the court erred in denying
their motion to admit additional evidence under Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b) and 56(f) after summary judgment for defendants had been
announced from the bench.

The proposed evidence, in the form of

an affidavit from a one-time treating physician whose identity
was known to plaintiffs well in advance of the summary judgment
argument but who was not named as a witness, did not meet the
requirements of the rules and was irrelevant to the issue of
Trooper Childs1 alleged impairment at the time of the accident,
the purpose for which it was presented.

The court was therefore

within its discretion to deny the motion.
In short, plaintiffs have shown neither abuse of discretion
nor error of law in the district court's decision.

Consequently,

that decision is entitled to this Court's affirmance.

9

ARGUMENT
I. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT TROOPER CHILDSf
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTE GOVERNING EMERGENCY VEHICLE
OPERATION ENTITLES HIM TO IMMUNITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 63-30-10(15).
A.

Recharacterizing the Claim as One for Negligent Supervision
Does Not Change the Relevant Facts or Alter the Analysis.
Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code waives governmental

immunity for injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions
of government employees.

However, the statute also contains a

number of explicit exceptions from that waiver "if the injury
arises out of, in connection with, or results from? specified
causes.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001) .

Included among

the listed causes is "the operation of an emergency vehicle,
while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section
41-6-14."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) (Supp. 2001).

The circumstance giving rise to plaintiffs' claim in the
present action is Trooper Childs' allegedly negligent operation
of his patrol vehicle, while responding to a call he perceived as
an emergency, in a manner that caused the death of plaintiffs1
son.

However, plaintiffs have withdrawn all individual claims

against Trooper Childs (see R. 651 at 9 ) . Even though their
cause of action "arises out of, in connection with, or results
from" the operation of an emergency vehicle by Trooper Childs
(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001)), plaintiffs attempt to
recharacterize their claim as one against defendant Utah Highway
Patrol (UHP) for negligent supervision.

10

This Court has repeatedly "rejected attempts to evade the
statutory categories by recharacterizing the supposed cause of
the injury."

Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996); see

also Bullock v. State, Dep't of Transp., 966 P.2d 1215, 1217
(Utah App. 1998).

As the Court has stated, "If a subpart of

section 63-30-10 describes that conduct or situati6n [giving rise
to the alleged injury], then immunity is preserved."
State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1994); see also

Malcolm v.

Ledfors v.

Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993).

For

this reason, the district court correctly analyzed plaintiffs'
action under the exception to waiver of immunity pursuant to the
emergency vehicle exception.
B.

There is No Need to Reach the Issue of Duty When Defendants
Have Not Challenged It and Governmental Immunity Provides a
Complete Defense.
In order for the emergency vehicle exception to apply, the

statute requires that the vehicle be driven in compliance with
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1998).

In relevant part, the statute

states:
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency
vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when
in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
the law or when responding to but not upon returning
from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges under
this section, subject to Subsections (2) through (4).
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency
vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the
provisions of this chapter;
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop
sign, but only after slowing down as may be
necessary for safe operation;
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction
of movement or turning in specified directions.

11

(3) Privileges granted under this section to the
operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not
involved in a vehicle pursuit, apply only when the
operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under
Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined
under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in front
of the vehicle.
Plaintiffs attempt to argue around the statute by contending
that before the question of immunity is reached, the court "must
first decide whether the defendants owed a duty of due care to
the plaintiff" (Aplt. Brief at 33). They further argue that
under this analytical approach, "the inquiry is not whether
§41-6-14 (1993) imposes a duty; rather, the question is whether
there are any statutory or common-law duties intended to protect
the plaintiffs from the type of harm they suffered" (Aplt. Brief
at 33-34) .

This argument both misconstrues the holdings of the

cases they cite in its support and squarely contradicts wellestablished authority to the contrary.

As the Court explained in

Ledfors, questions of governmental immunity are independent of
the tort questions of duty and breach:
In some of our past cases in which we analyzed
such a claim against a governmental entity, we have
begun with a traditional tort analysis to determine
whether the plaintiff had alleged a legally cognizable
duty and breach of duty. If the plaintiff had not
stated a legally valid tort cause of action, we usually
have declined to undertake the immunity analysis. At
other times, we have performed the immunity analysis
first, typically when it ended the inquiry.
Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1163-64 (citations omitted).

In other

words, the purpose of undertaking a duty analysis first is to
ensure that no duty is presumed where none exists:
Whatever the order in which we address the
questions, it is important to keep in mind that a
12

legislative waiver of immunity is not a legislative
consent to liability. Even when immunity is waived,
there can be no liability absent a breach of a common
law duty owed to the plaintiff.
Id.

Where duty is not contested--as in Ledfors, and as here, for

purposes of summary judgment--and where the statutory exception
to waiver of immunity resolves the claim, there is no reason to
reach the element of duty.

Instead, the court will assume,

without deciding, the existence of a legal duty.

See Malcolm,

878 P.2d at 1146.
The cases on which plaintiffs rely, Day v. State, 1999 UT
46, 980 P.2d 1171, and Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616,
vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 2000 UT 55, 5 P.3d
616, are not to the contrary (see Aplt. Brief at 32-36).

In Day,

the State defendants explicitly raised the issue of whether they
owed a duty of care to plaintiff:

"The State denies that it or

Officer Colyar owed a duty of care to the Days."
at 111.

Day, 1999 UT 46

In that circumstance, as the Court observed, "If Officer

Colyar owed no duty of care to the Days, there can be no prima
facie case of negligence as a matter of law, and immunity would
be immaterial."

Id. at 1l0.

The opposite is true here:

if

immunity applies, as the district court held that it does, the
issue of duty is immaterial.

Because defendants in the case at

bar have never challenged the element of duty, Day is factually
inapposite to plaintiffs1 claims.
Nor does Lyon support plaintiffs' position.

The Lyon

defendants, like defendants here, contended that provisions of

13

the Governmental Immunity Act provided them complete immunity.
The Court "address [ed] this claim first because plaintiffs other
claims are relevant only if the Act does not provide complete
immunity."

Lyon, 2000 UT 19, 1|l0.

Plaintiffs have provided no

reason compelling the Court, contrary to its own decision in
Lyon, to address an issue there is no need to reach.
Plaintiffs' statutory construction argument on the issue of
duty (see Aplt. Brief at 35-38) fails for two reasons.

First, as

explained above, it addresses an issue which would have been
relevant only had the trial court found that immunity did not
provide a complete defense.

Second, the argument was not raised

in the trial court and is therefore inappropriate for this
Court's deliberations.

It is the well-established practice of

Utah's appellate courts not to reach issues not presented to the
trial court.

"An appellate court generally will not review any

issue that was not raised in the court below.

This rule is

based, in part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the
trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue that it was
never given the opportunity to consider."

Ellis v. Swensen, 2000

UT 101, 1|30, 16 P.3d 1233 (citation omitted); see also Julian v.
State, 966 P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998) (noting the court's
"longstanding rule that we will not consider issues raised for
the first time on appeal").

Because plaintiffs did not give the

trial court an opportunity to rule on their statutory
construction argument, it is improperly presented here.
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C.

The Undisputed Facts Entitle Defendants to Immunity under
the Emergency Vehicle Exception.
The Test and the Undisputed Facts
The test for governmental immunity is
a three-step analysis: (1) Did the [defendants] here
perform a governmental function?
(2) If so, does some
section of the governmental immunity act waive the
general immunity granted by section 63-30-3? ' (3) Does
the governmental immunity act nonetheless except from
that waiver of blanket immunity the particular claim
asserted here?

Petersen v. Board of E d u c , 855 P.2d 241, 243 (Utah 1993).
Plaintiffs have conceded the performance of a governmental
function under section 63-30-3, the waiver of immunity under
section 63-3-10, and the existence of an apparent exception under
section 63-30-10(15) (see Aplt. Brief at 39). As they admit,
"[t]he question is whether the exception applies" (id.).

The

court's careful application of the law to the relevant,
undisputed facts shows that it does.
The court predicated its decision on the following eight
undisputed facts:
1. At the time of the collision Trooper Childs was
responding to an emergency radio call.
2. At the time of the collision Trooper Childs was
driving in an authorized emergency vehicle as defined
by UCA 41-6-1(3) .
3. At the time of the collision Trooper Childs had
activated the vehicle[']s visible signal as defined by
UCA 41-6-132.
4. The collision took place on Carbon Avenue south of
the intersection of Carbon Avenue and 5th South (the
intersection). Immediately north of the intersection
is a cross walk.
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5. Michael Kouris was not crossing Carbon Avenue at
the cross walk. The point of collision being some 3 0+
feet south of the cross walk.
6. There are no semaphores or stop signs at the
intersection controlling traffic in the direction both
Trooper Childs and Michael Kouris were traveling.
7.

The state and UHP are governmental entities.

8. At the time of the collision Cortland Childs was
acting within the scope of his employment with the Utah
Highway Patrol.
R. 611-12.

Plaintiffs attack the findings numbered 1, 3, 4, and

5 (see Aplt. Brief at 28-32) as genuinely disputed for purposes
of summary judgment.

The record, however, belies their

contentions.
The Call was One to Which an Emergency Response was Appropriate
Plaintiffs first claim that there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Trooper Childs was responding to an
emergency (see Aplt. Brief at 28-31).

In support of this claim,

they attach, as an exhibit to their brief, an excerpt from the
affidavit of Officer Tracy Allred of the Price Police Department
(Aplt. Brief at Ex. B ) . The exhibit, however, does not support
plaintiffs' contention that Officer Allred did not believe the
call was an emergency.

It merely recounts what the officer heard

when the initial call about the child riding in an automobile
trunk was made to dispatch.

Contrary to plaintiffs1

representation, the excerpt contains no statement by Officer
Allred describing the dispatch as "a response call" rather than
an emergency (see Aplt. Brief at 29), nor does it support
plaintiffs' representation that Officer Allred "did not turn on
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his emergency lights or sirens.

He did not speed to the scene,

nor break any other traffic laws as he responded to the scene"
(id.).

In fact, there is nothing in the record to indicate that

Officer Allred responded to the call at all (though he did
respond to the subsequent accident), particularly in light of the
fact that Trooper Childs communicated that he was the closest
vehicle and would respond (see R. 190).
Tellingly, plaintiffs have not given a record citation for
the Allred deposition excerpt, there is no other indication that
it was ever presented as evidence to the trial court, and
defendants' scrutiny of the record has found no trace of it. As
this Court has stated, "[W]e do not consider new evidence on
appeal."

Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990); see also

Otteson v. State, Dep't of Human Services, 945 P.2d 170, 171
(Utah App. 1997) ("Appellate courts will not consider new
evidence on appeal").

Therefore, even if the Allred excerpt were

relevant to plaintiffs' argument, it is properly disregarded by
the Court as not of record in the trial court.
The evidence of record uniformly supports the district
court's finding.

Trooper Childs stated in his deposition that he

considered the situation an emergency (R. 187). Newell Knight,
an accident reconstructionist (see R. 113), replied affirmatively
in his deposition when asked if he agreed that the situation was
an emergency (R. 287). Don Kelley, Trooper Childs' sergeant at
the time of the accident, also agreed in his deposition testimony
that the situation was an emergency (R. 212-13) .
17

Even

plaintiffs1 reconstruction expert, Ronald Probert (see R. 107),
acknowledged that it was within Trooper Childs' discretion to
respond to the situation as an emergency (R. 284). Not a shred
of record evidence supports plaintiffs' contention that a genuine
issue of material fact exists regarding the propriety of Trooper
Childs' election to respond to the call as an emergency.
Trooper Childs Activated a Visual Signal as Required by Statute
Plaintiffs concede that Trooper Childs "turn[ed] on his
lights as he passed Tammy Auberger" before the collision (Aplt.
Brief at 31). This concession is fully consistent with the
deposition testimony of the witnesses.

As Trooper Childs

explained, he activated his lights, increased his speed, and
changed lanes to pass Ms. Auberger's car all at the same time
(R. 190-91) . This testimony is corroborated by the statements of
two other witnesses, Jan Nelson (see R. 413-14) and John
Wunnenberg (see R. 204) .

Even plaintiffs do not contend that Ms.

Auberger's failure to observe the lights raises a genuine issue
of material fact.
In addition to conceding the fact that Trooper Childs'
emergency lights were activated prior to the collision,
plaintiffs do not argue that this visible signal failed to comply
with the statute.

Instead, they maintain that the activation of

the lights was an insufficient precaution.

Their irrelevant,

two-sentence argument on this point (see Aplt. Brief at 31) is
both inflammatory and unsupported by record evidence.

Contending

that Trooper Childs "was speeding through an intersection with
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children in the crosswalk" (Aplt. Brief at 31) (emphasis in
original), they ignore the uncontested facts that Michael entered
the intersection more than 36 feet before the crosswalk (R. 195)
and that the point of impact was south of the intersection (see
R. 196 and 201).

It is likewise uncontested that the crosswalk

in question was north of the intersection (see R. 196 and 201).
through

Consequently, Trooper ChiIds could not have been speeding
the intersection with children present; he did not speed
the intersection at all.

through

Moreover, as defendants pointed out

below, the witness testimony on which plaintiffs relied "was that
children were near

the crosswalk, not in

the crosswalk" (R. 273;

see also R. 3 96), and "the video of the accident shows that no
one was in the crosswalk at the time of the accident" (R. 273).
Plaintiffs' unsupported statement to the contrary serves no
purpose other than an attempt to provoke the Court's outrage.

It

certainly does nothing to establish whether a visual signal was
properly activated.
The Location of the Intersection and Crosswalk are Not Contested
Plaintiffs list as contested the district court's statement
regarding the location of the collision and the crosswalk (see
Aplt. Brief at 31). Beyond repeating the court's statement, they
provide no analysis of the court's language or citation to the
record.

This void does not fulfill plaintiffs' burden under Utah

R. App. P. 24(a)(9), which requires that "[t]he argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect
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to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."

This

Court has repeatedly held that it "'is not simply a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research.»"

Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.\ 2001 UT 77,

U20 n.4, 31 P.3d 557 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450
(Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087,
416 N.E. 2d 783, 784, 48 111. Dec. 510 (111. App. 1981))); see
also State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, \ l \

n.3, 27 P.3d 1133.

Given the absence of any discussion by plaintiffs, there is no
need to give further consideration to this unsupported challenge.
Plaintiffs did Not Argue Below that Michael was in the Crosswalk
Plaintiffs now purport to contest the previously undisputed
fact that Michael was not in the crosswalk at the time of the
collision (see Aplt. Brief at 32). Not only is this fact
immaterial to the issues for decision, but it has been raised for
the first time on appeal.

As previously noted, it is the Court's

well-established practice not to review issues appellants failed
to raise in the district court.
Julian, 966 P.2d at 258.

See Ellis, 2000 UT 101, 1f3 0;

Plaintiffs have articulated no grounds

on which this well-established rule should be ignored.
Even if the Court were to consider plaintiffs' belated
challenge, plaintiffs have not shown how the fact is material to
whether defendants complied with the emergency vehicle operation
statute, which bears no language addressing crosswalks.
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As this

Court has recognized, "the mere existence of genuine issues of
fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the entry of
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of
the case."

Horcran v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752

(Utah 1982).

Plaintiffs have made no attempt to show any nexus

between Michael's position in or out of the crosswalk and the
issues before the Court for determination.
The Court Correctly Applied the Law to the Undisputed Facts
Given the undisputed facts as the trial court found them,
plaintiffs have shown--and can show--no error in its application
of the law to the facts.

Trooper Childs was operating an

authorized emergency vehicle and responding to an emergency call.
Therefore, under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14, he was statutorily
privileged to exceed the maximum speed limit and to disregard
regulations governing direction of movement and turning.

Those

privileges are restricted to emergency vehicles using a visual
signal as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-132 which is
visible from the front of the vehicle or, alternatively, an
audible signal.

(Plaintiffs have raised no issue regarding the

compliance of the emergency lights in the patrol vehicle with
section 41-6-132.)

Trooper Childs activated the visual signal

prior to the collision in compliance with the plain language of
the statute.

For these reasons, the court correctly concluded

that " [a]t the time of the collision Trooper Childs was operating
his emergency vehicle in accordance with the requirements of UCA
41-6-14" (R. 612) and that defendants are consequently immune
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from liability under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15), a
determination entitled to affirmance by this Court.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT WITNESS.
A.

Admissibility of Expert Testimony is a Matter within the
Trial Court's Discretion
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs the testimony

of expert witnesses.

Under the rule, "[i]f scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an expert opinion or otherwise."
jurisprudence,

Under this Court's

fl

[t]he trial court has wide discretion in

determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such
decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Under this standard, we will not reverse unless the decision
exceeds the limits of reasonability."

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d

1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
B.

The Motion to Strike the Expert's Affidavit was Timely
In attempting to circumvent Trooper Childs' immunity under

the law, plaintiffs claim that he was impaired by prescription
medications at the time of the accident.

In support of this

claim, plaintiffs designated Richard Streumpler, a clinical
chemist with no medical training, as their sole expert witness on
the issue of Trooper Childs' purported impairment.

This

designation was mailed to defendants on April 10, 2000, and filed
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with the trial court on April 13 (see R. 106 and 108). However,
not until August 28, 2000, did plaintiffs provide Streumpler's
curriculum vitae to defendants (see R. 520), who took his
deposition just four days later, on September 1 (id.).
Although defendants' motion for summary judgment had been
mailed to plaintiffs on August 4, 2000, and filed with the court
on August 7 (see R. 156 and 158), plaintiffs sought and received
an extension of nearly three weeks, until September 6, 2000, to
serve defendants with a copy of their response, which included
the Streumpler affidavit.

The response was filed with the court

on September 18, 2000 (see R. 360). Defendants mailed their
motion to strike the affidavit to plaintiffs on September 13,
2000 (R. 302), only five days after the affidavit was originally
mailed to them; the motion was filed with the court on September
18 (R. 289).
It is clear from this timetable that defendants not only
responded promptly to the information provided in the affidavit,
but that they agreed to an extension of nearly three weeks for
plaintiffs to file the affidavit in response to defendants1
motion for summary judgment.

Any argument plaintiffs make as to

a lack of timeliness in moving to strike the tardy affidavit is
unsupported by the facts.

Moreover, as defendants pointed out

below, plaintiffs provide no authority establishing a time
requirement for the filing of a motion to strike (see R. 520).
Further, as Utah's appellate courts have recognized,
"It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and
superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers
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not derived from any statute. Among these are the
power to . . . make, modify, and enforce rules for the
regulation of the business before the court . . . .
Such inherent powers of courts are necessary to the
proper discharge of their duties . . . ."
Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, 1l3, 985 P.2d 255 (quoting In
re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217, 224 (1913) (cited in Barnard
v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993))).

See also Charlie

Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370
(Utah App. 1987) (noting "'the control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases'") (quoting Link v. Wabash
R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962))).

Especially in light of

plaintiffs' own request for additional time to file a response to
the motion for summary judgment, the court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing defendants' motion to strike.
The district court, observing that defendants became aware
of the competence issue only on plaintiffs' use of the Streumpler
affidavit in response to the summary judgment motion, stated that
the motion to strike
was timely and in support of [defendants'] Motion for
Summary Judgement [sic] which was also timely filed
under the original scheduling order, before August 10,
2000, to wit: on August 7, 2000. Discovery under the
original scheduling order was to have been complete by
May 19, 2000. The parties mutually agreed to an
extension of that date and the Court concurred in their
actions. The original oral arguments on dispositive
motions were to be scheduled before September 1, 2000.
Again, however, at the request of the parties the Court
concurred in a modification of that original order and
scheduled oral argument for September 18, 2000. At the
same time the Court allowed the parties time to file
formal responses to various pending motions, as well as
pleadings to clear up the record to the extent
necessary. Again, the order provided for specific
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dates for those filings and it appears from the record
that the parties, although not technically complying
with those dates, may have shared their responses in a
relatively timely fashion and neither party raised
those issues in their pleadings and/or at oral
argument.
R. 609-10.

Plaintiffs neither cite to nor address the court's

explanation for its decision that the motion to strike was
timely.

However, it is clear that the court's decision was based

on the course of action between the parties and the court's own
concurrence in it.

Plaintiffs have not only failed to show an

abuse of discretion by the court, but have waived the issue of
the motion's timeliness by not raising it in pleadings or oral
argument to the trial court prior to its initial grant of summary
judgment for defendants.
C.

The Expert Witness was Unqualified to Address Impairment
Nor have plaintiffs established an abuse of discretion in

the court's substantive decision finding Streumpler unqualified
to render an opinion on Trooper Childs' alleged impairment.

As

the court explained, it
never suggested that Dr. Richard Streumpler could not
testify at trial about matters within his competence.
The Court only concluded that the causal connection
between Trooper Childs' pain therapy medications and
Michael Kouris's death were beyond such competency and
since there was no other designated expert and
certainly no evidence by affidavit or otherwise from a
competent expert before the Court, plaintiff's [sic]
case must fail for lack of such evidence as a matter of
law.
R. 611.

The court ruled that the motion "should be granted for

the reasons set forth therein" (R. 610).
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Defendants did not argue that Streumpler was unqualified to
testify as to the levels of prescription medications found in the
sample of Trooper Childs1 blood that was drawn immediately
following the accident.

Instead, they argued that his training

and experience did not qualify him to testify as to whether
Trooper Childs was medically impaired by these prescribed drugs.
See R. 296-300.

An examination of Streumpler's affidavit

supports defendants1 argument and the court ! s decision.

After an

extensive review of the substances found in the blood sample
(R. 305-06), Streumpler's affidavit states as follows:
10. The PDR (Physicians Desk Reference) states
each of these medications may impair the mental and
physical ability to drive a motor vehicle.
11. Found alone, each of the medications in Mr.
Childs1 blood could impair his ability to drive.
However, taking these medications in combination (even
at the prescribed doses) could accelerate the amount of
impairment.
12. In my opinion, Mr. Childs was impaired by use
of these medications at the time of the motor vehicle
accident on 7/19/98.
R. 3 06 (emphasis added).

The affidavit makes clear that

Streumpler's opinion on the effect of the medications on Trooper
Childs was based solely on speculation that possible side effects
of the prescribed medications may have occurred.
As prior decisions have established, where there is
speculation as to medical causation, "!?,the claim fails as a
matter of law."1"

Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904,

907 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893
P.2d 598, 601 (Utah App. 1995); see also Beard v. K-Mart Corp.,
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2000 UT App 285, %7, 12 P.3d 1015 (relying on Penney v. St.
Mark's Hosp.. 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968), "for the
proposition that 'if the expert evidence offered on the issue of
medical causation is simply that a particular [status] could have
resulted from a particular [event], but not that it probably did,
such testimony is insufficient for submission of the issue to the
jury 1 ")).

Nor is the requirement for expert medical evidence

limited to cases of medical malpractice.

See Beard, 2000 UT App

285 at fl2.
The cases cited by plaintiffs are readily distinguishable
from the circumstances present here.

Watkins v. Utah Poultry &

Farmers Cooperative, 122 Utah 459, 251 P.2d 663 (1952), involved
the testimony of non-expert, fact witnesses as to their personal
observations of the defendant's conduct in the hours prior to an
accident.

By contrast, plaintiffs in the present case

acknowledge that their expert has never personally examined
Trooper Childs (see R. 545).

In State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795

(Utah 1975), an officer who had held a special assignment in
narcotics and drugs for two-and-a half years, who had attended a
Maryland State Narcotics Seminar, and who had taken a course on
drugs at the Utah State Police Academy was permitted to testify
as to the probable effect of the plaintiff's use of a given
amount of heroin seven hours before testifying.

The trial court

explained to the jury that the only charge against the
defendant was theft; and that any evidence pertaining
to the use of heroin had had nothing to do with her
guilt or innocence of that charge; that they should not
"indulge any bias or prejudice against her because of
27

the use of heroin"; and that that testimony had been
admitted "for one purpose only, and that purpose is for
you to try to determine her mental condition at the
time she testifies . . . [so] you can properly evaluate
her testimony."
Mason, 530 P.2d at 797-98.

The Court, acknowledging the trial

court's "considerable latitude of discretion" (530 P.2d at 798),
declined to find an abuse of discretion.

In the present case,

unlike in Mason, the expert testimony in the form of the
Streumpler affidavit did not address a defendant's testimonial
capacity, but directly addressed an issue pertaining to
defendants! liability.
The two remaining cases plaintiffs cite are not Utah cases
and are therefore not binding authority.

They are of little

persuasive value in the light of contrary Utah precedent.

In

Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963), an
industrial hygienist and toxicologist was permitted to testify
that a substance is toxic to humans generally (other medically
trained experts testified as to its effect on the plaintiff).
However, in addition to his "extensive training and experience in
the field of toxicology" (316 F.2d at 493), he also had "two
years of scientific work in a medical school" (id.).
by contrast, had

Streumpler,

u

no medical training whatsoever" (R. 290).

Finally, in State v. Piatt, 496 S.W.2d 878 (Mo. App. 1973), the
challenged expert testimony was held inadmissible for lack of
materiality.

Consequently, any statement addressing the issue of

its admissibility on other grounds is merely dictum.
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Defendants provided substantial case authority below showing
that non-medical experts are not qualified to testify to medical
causation.

See R. 298-300.

Plaintiffs have addressed none of

these cases, nor have they provided any authority demonstrating
an abuse of discretion by the trial court in striking the
Streumpler affidavit.

Because the court's decision on this issue

does not exceed the limits of reasonability, there is no basis
for its reversal.
D.

Testimony as to Drugs in Trooper Childs1 Blood is Irrelevant
Because It is Not Causally Linked to Any Alleged Impairment
Plaintiffs attempt to create an issue out of Trooper Childs1

prescription drug use by claiming that it shows Trooper Childs to
have violated Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (1998).

This statutory

provision prohibits persons from operating motor vehicles if
their bodies contain measurable quantities of controlled
substances or their metabolites.

Prescription of the controlled

substance for the use of the accused is an affirmative defense.
Plaintiffs1 argument on this point is simply irrelevant to
defendants' liability, as the court correctly concluded.

Not

only does governmental immunity provide a complete defense of
defendants' actions, making it unnecessary to reach plaintiffs'
other claims (see Lyon, 2000 UT at UlO), but there is no evidence
of record that suggests any causal nexus between the prescription
medications in Trooper Childs' bloodstream at the time of the
collision and the accident.
Neither plaintiffs' nor defendants' accident reconstruction
expert calculated a delay in Trooper Childs' reaction time that
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would have contributed to the accident.

When asked about

reaction time, defendants1 expert, Newell Knight, testified in
deposition that "I don't see any delay in his time.

When I ran

those numbers with various distances, I said I just don't see a
delay of perception on him.

I cannot at this point prove there

was a delay of perception on the part of Cort Childs" (R. 314).
While plaintiffs1 reconstructionist, Ronald Probert, indicated in
his deposition that impairment would generally lengthen a
driver's reaction time, he did not base his calculations on
impaired reaction times (see R. 318). As the trial court
correctly ruled,
[W]ithout competent expert opinion of impairment at the
time of the collision, there was no evidence of a
causal connection between the medications allegedly
taken by Trooper Childs and the collision, and any
other evidence of the effect of drugs, etc., in the
abstract[,] eg. [sic] not specifically tied to Trooper
Childs and this incident [,] was irrelevant and
inadmissible, both as to the Motion for Summary
Judgment and as to any trial in the matter.
R. 610.

Without a causal connection to plaintiffs' injury, any

violation of section 41-6-44.6 is meaningless to establish
liability.

Plaintiffs' failure to establish a causal connection

in the trial court gives this Court no ground on which to disturb
its decision on this point.
III. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REJECTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
After the trial court initially struck the Streumpler
affidavit and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
from the bench (see R. 652 at 52), plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration of the decision under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and
30

56(f) (R. 539-78).

Rule 60(b) permits a court to "relieve a

party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for" various reasons, including "(2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)" and
"(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."

The basis for plaintiffs' motion was that "there were

other designated medical witness [es] with different credentials
who could also testify as to Trooper Childs' drug use and
impairment" (R. 543). The witness plaintiffs identified in the
memorandum supporting the motion was Dr. John Bender, who
"examined Trooper Childs in November, 1991" (R. 544)--nearly
seven years before the accident.
As a part of their motion to reconsider, plaintiffs
contended that the court had failed to rule on an earlier
request, contained in their memorandum opposing the motion to
strike the Streumpler affidavit, to grant them additional time to
procure another affidavit pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f).
Attached as an exhibit to the memorandum in support of the motion
to reconsider was Dr. Bender's affidavit (R. 563-66).

Plaintiffs

alleged that Dr. Bender was a designated witness "and that both
parties were aware of his existence and his potential testimony,
and therefore no surprise existed to justify this Court refusing
to grant plaintiff's [sic] continuance" (R. 607).
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f),
[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that he
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cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court may
refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that under Rule 56(f), "courts should not
grant such motions when a party is dilatory or the arguments are
lacking in merit" (Aplt. Brief at 23). However, they reject the
trial court ! s conclusion
that the delays in this matter have been predominantly
caused by plaintiffs; plaintiff's [sic] failed to move
to amend the designation of expert witnesses; and/or
failed to submit with their Rule 56(f) Motion the
affidavit of Dr. Bender; or set forth reasons for their
failure to do so. All of the foregoing justify and
require this Court to deny the Motion for Continuance,
and also the Motion to Reconsider.
R. 610.
Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that " [w]hen a Rule 56(f)
motion is made, the trial court's discretion is invoked" (see
Aplt. Brief at 23). This Court "ha[s] held that when a party
timely presents an affidavit under rule 56(f) stating reasons why
it is unable to proffer an evidentiary affidavit in opposition to
its opponent's motion for summary judgment, the trial court's
discretion is invoked."

United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater

Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 893 (Utah 1993).
affidavit wais filed.

Here, no such

As the court noted in denying the motion

for reconsideration, plaintiffs did not comply "with Rule 56(f)
since they neither proffered Dr. Bender's affidavit nor set forth
any explanation or justification why it was not provided"
(R. 608). On appeal, plaintiffs have not addressed this finding.
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Instead, they contend that they "proffered the testimony of Dr.
Bender at oral argument, they offered to obtain an additional
affidavit, and did in fact obtain that affidavit" (Aplt. Brief at
24).

None of these actions cured plaintiffs' failure to invoke

the court's discretion by presenting an affidavit containing the
facts relevant to their inability to provide the evidentiary
affidavit in a timely manner.
Contrary to plaintiffs1 argument below, plaintiffs had never
designated Dr. Bender as a witness who could testify as to
Trooper Childs' alleged drug impairment; in fact, they never
identified him by name at all.

Instead, they included on their

witness list a generic designation of unnamed "medical providers
who have treated defendant Cortland Childs in the past" (R. 108}
to be identified more specifically as trial approached "unless
there is a stipulation that those medical records and reports can
be admitted without foundational testimony" (id.).

No specific

identification of these individuals was made prior to plaintiffs'
tardy proffer.

Moreover, by plaintiffs' own admission, Dr.

Bender treated Trooper Childs in November, 1991 (R. 544).
Plaintiffs do not articulate how a 1991 examination is relevant
to a determination of impairment at the time of an accident that
occurred in 1998.

In addition, because Dr. Bender's affidavit as

originally filed with the court was neither signed nor notarized
(see R. 566), it was ineffective.

See Goetz v. American Reliable

Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 366, 372 (Utah App. 1992) (observing that
under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), "affidavits 'shall set forth such
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facts as would be admissible in evidence,' which requires an oath
by reason of Utah R.Evid. 603").

(It is questionable whether a

signed copy was ever filed with the court.
paginated record.)

None appears in the

Finally, given plaintiffs' claim to have

designated Dr. Bender in their April, 2000 witness list, they can
hardly claim to have acted diligently in attempting to obtain his
affidavit.

In light of these facts, the district court cannot be

said to have abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs1 motion
for reconsideration, and its decision is entitled to this Court's
affirmance.

CONCLUSION
The material facts that underlie this case are undisputed.
Trooper Childs, in responding appropriately to an emergency call,
collided with plaintiffs' minor son, with a tragic result.

While

initially suing both the trooper and his employer, plaintiffs
relinquished all claims against Trooper Childs, choosing instead
to pursue only a negligent supervision action against UHP.
Because governmental immunity protects defendants from liability
under the exception to waiver of liability for emergency vehicle
operation, plaintiffs' claim cannot go forward.

For this reason,

the district court correctly granted summary judgment in
defendants' favor.
The trial court acted within its discretion to exclude the
testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness.

Not only was the issue

of impairment beyond the witness' expertise, but it was
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irrelevant because the Governmental Immunity Act provided a
complete defense for defendants1 actions and because plaintiffs
failed to establish a nexus of causation between any alleged
impairment and the harm they suffered.

It was also within the

court's discretion to deny plaintiffs' belated attempt to
substitute a previously unnamed witness after the judge struck
the expert's affidavit and announced summary judgment for
defendants from the bench.

Rather than showing that the district

court abused its discretion, plaintiffs merely repeat on appeal
the arguments made unsuccessfully below.
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, defendants
respectfully request the Court to affirm the judgment of the
district court.
Dated this

day of December, 2001.

que

Nancy l \ Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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